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Abstract
Programs are bloated. Our study shows that only 5% of
libc is used on average across the Ubuntu Desktop envi-
ronment (2016 programs); the heaviest user, vlc media
player, only needed 18%.
In this paper: (1) We present a debloating framework
built on a compiler toolchain that can successfully de-
bloat programs (shared/static libraries and executables).
Our solution can successfully compile and load most li-
braries on Ubuntu Desktop 16.04. (2) We demonstrate
the elimination of over 79% of code from coreutils
and 86% of code from SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark pro-
grams without affecting functionality. We show that even
complex programs such as Firefox and curl can be
debloated without a need to recompile. (3) We demon-
strate the security impact of debloating by eliminating
over 71% of reusable code gadgets from the coreutils
suite, and show that unused code that contains real-world
vulnerabilities can also be successfully eliminated with-
out adverse effects on the program. (4) We incur a low
load time overhead.
1 Introduction
Reusing code is a common and indispensable practice
in software development. Commonly, developers follow
a one-size-fits-all methodology where features are pack-
aged into reusable code modules (e.g., libraries) that are
designed to service multiple diverse sets of clients (or
applications). While this model aids the development
process, it presents a detrimental impact on security and
performance. A majority of clients may not use all of
the functionalities. For example, the standard C library
(libc) is intended to be widely useful, and usable across
a broad spectrum of applications although not all features
are used by all applications. Clients must bear the bur-
den of carrying all the features in the code with no way
to disable or remove those features.
This extraneous code may contain its own bugs and
vulnerabilities and therefore broadens the overall attack
surface. Additionally, these features add unnecessary
burden on modern defenses (e.g., CFI) that do not dis-
tinguish between used and unused features in software.
Accumulation of unnecessary code in a binary – either
by design (e.g., shared libraries) or due to software devel-
opment inefficiencies – amounts to code bloating. As a
typical example, shared libraries are designed to contain
the union of all functionality required by its users.
Static dead-code-elimination – a static analysis tech-
nique used to identify unused code paths and remove
them from the final binary – employed during compila-
tion is an effective means to reduce bloat. In fact, under
higher levels of optimization, modern compilers (clang,
gcc) aggressively optimize code to minimize footprint.
However, a major limitation to static dead-code elimina-
tion is that dead code in dynamically linked libraries can-
not be removed; shared libraries are pre-built and are not
analyzed by the loader. Inter-module dependency infor-
mation is not available either. As a result, a large fraction
of overall bloat occurs in shared libraries. Alternatively,
programs can be statically linked (to apply dead-code
elimination), but there are two main hurdles: patches to
libraries require recompilation of all programs, which is
not feasible, and licenses such as (L)GPL can compli-
cate redistribution. Dynamic linking is key to practical
and backwards-compatible solutions.
To exemplify the security impact of bloating, con-
sider libc, a Swiss Army knife in the arsenal of an at-
tacker [34]. Suppose we are to implement a minimal
program that simply exits and does nothing else. In
assembly, this program will only contain three instruc-
tions (mov $1, %eax; mov $0, %ebx; int $0x80).
However, a gcc compiled program will require the en-
tirety of libc (>165k instructions) despite the fact that
only the entry point handler is needed.
This is true for any of the several flavors of libc such
as glibc and musl-libc. If we were able to detect this
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case and remove the rest of the libc code, then CFI and
other solutions would be more effective since there are
fewer control flows to analyze. Reusable gadgets origi-
nating from unused code are automatically removed due
to debloating and attack characteristics for detection can
be refined and confined to the smaller code base and be-
havior space. All of this hinges on the ability to remove
unused code.
In this paper, we introduce a generic inter-modular
late-stage debloating framework. As a primary contri-
bution, our solution combines static (i.e., compile-time)
and dynamic (i.e., load-time) approaches to systemat-
ically detect and automatically eliminate unused code
from program memory. We do this by removing unused
and therefore unnecessary code (by up to 90% in some
test cases). This can be thought of as a runtime exten-
sion to dead code elimination. As a direct impact, our
solution significantly increases the effectiveness of cur-
rent software defense by drastically reducing the amount
of code they must analyze and protect.
We identify and remove unused code by introducing a
piece-wise compiler that not only compiles code mod-
ules (executables, shared and static objects), but also
generates a dependency graph that retains all compiler
knowledge on which function depends on what other
function(s). Traditional loaders will simply ignore the
section, but our piece-wise loader will read the depen-
dency information and will only dynamically load func-
tions that are needed by a program. The dependency in-
formation is written to an optional ELF section. Here,
and in the rest of this paper, we use the generalized term
“code module” to signify a shared library, static library
or an executable and “loader” to signify both loader and
dynamic linker.
CFI vs Piece-wise. Piece-wise compilation and load-
ing is not a replacement for CFI. It is an orthogonal
solution that reduces attack space by performing cross-
module code reduction with zero runtime overhead. This
not only reduces the amount and diversity of available
gadgets, but more importantly, it reduces the amount of
code to be analyzed by other defenses and thus signifi-
cantly amplifies their security impact. For example, our
study shows that on average only 5% of libc functions
are imported by a program. Therefore, in conjunction
with piece-wise, CFI and other gadget removal defenses
(e.g. [28]) only need to analyze 5% of libc code. In
essence, libc protected by both piece-wise and CFI ex-
poses significantly less attack space than libc protected
by only CFI. Moreover, CFI primarily provides exploit
mitigation and no post-compromise protection, whereas
by eliminating unused code, piece-wise prevents execu-
tion of unused code even after compromise. This is why
we believe piece-wise is complementary to CFI.
Our contributions:
1. We perform a comprehensive study of how glibc
and other shared libraries are used in a set of over
2016 diverse programs across different domains
(e.g., http server, database, MPEG players, docu-
ment editors) in Ubuntu Desktop 16.04. A detailed
and lateral study across multiple libraries can be
found in our prior work [32]. We report that in the
average case 95% of code in glibc is never used.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
conduct such a study for glibc.
2. We implement an LLVM-based piece-wise com-
piler that retains dependency information and gen-
erates backwards-compatible ELF files. Our com-
piler handles inlined assembly and implements
three different independent approaches to capture
indirect code pointers. We also introduce a back-
ward compatible piece-wise loader that eliminates
bloat.
3. Applying our toolchain to GNU coreutils, we
eliminiate over 79% of code and 71% of ROP gad-
gets in musl-libc while passing all the tests ac-
companied by the coreutils suite. Our solution
introduces a low load-time overhead.
4. We demonstrate that several real world vulnerabil-
ities in unused code can be successfully eliminated
using our piece-wise compiler and loader.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides details and results from our study of
shared library usage. Section 3 gives an overview as well
as challenges and design goals of our methodology for
late-stage debloating. Sections 4 and 5 describes in de-
tails each part of our toolchain in details. We evaluate the
piece-wise prototype in Section 6. Finally, we discuss re-
lated works in section 7 and conclude in section 8.
2 Bloating
Study: Code bloating occurs when a program contains
excess unused code in its address space. To get a sense
of how pervasive and serious bloating is, we conducted
a study encompassing all the userspace programs in
Ubuntu Desktop 16.04. For each program, we 1) iden-
tified all libraries the program depends on using ldd;
2) identified all functions imported by the program and
which library the symbol can be found in as well as their
intra-modular dependencies; and 3) for each dependent
library, identified the exported functions that were never
imported by the program. In essence, we recursively tra-
versed through all dependent code modules of a program
and gathered all the function-level dependencies.
On average, only 10.22% of functions in the top 15
most used shared libraries are used by programs (full re-
sults in Appendix A). In the case of the most utilized (i.e.,
Table 1: Code footprint in libc corresponding to a sub-
set of programs in the study. The mean reflects the geo-
metric mean of all programs in the study.
Program # Functions # Insns % FnFootprint
% Insn
Footprint
vlc 606 33371 21% 18%
rhythmbox 579 28517 20% 16%
unopkg.bin 520 27576 19% 16%
gst-xmlinspect-0.10 542 30184 19% 17%
kubuntu-debug-installer 531 29258 19% 16%
soffice.bin 543 29723 19% 17%
checkbox-gui 525 28044 19% 15%
VBoxTestOGL 500 26219 18% 15%
ktrash 492 25621 18% 14%
kchmviewer 504 27530 18% 15%
kdebugdialog 503 27468 18% 15%
kwalletd 506 27557 18% 15%
nepomukmigrator 503 27468 18% 15%
kdesu 519 27822 18% 15%
signon-ui 498 27074 18% 15%
spotydl 510 26406 18% 14%
webapp-container 513 26516 18% 15%
knetattach 510 27598 18% 15%
nepomukbackup 512 27637 18% 15%
notepadqq-bin 504 27280 18% 15%
... ... ... ... ...
Mean 176 9904 6% 5%
least bloated) library libstdc++, only 37.77% of the li-
brary is used. On the other extreme, as low as 4% of
code in libgcc is used. Furthermore, Table 1 contains
a list of programs that best utilize libc, i.e., contained
the largest footprint within libc. Even vlc player – the
least bloated program in the study – only used 18% of
code loaded into memory.
2.1 Root Causes of Bloating
We report four main causes of bloating that we discov-
ered through our study.
Multiple Disjoint Functionalities. By design, code
modules may pack multiple functionalities that may
be disjoint. For example, libc provides subrou-
tines for memory management (e.g., malloc, calloc,
free), file I/O (e.g., fopen, fclose, printf,
scanf), string manipulation (e.g., strcpy, toupper,
tolower), etc. In fact, we found as many as 30 different
disjoint features packaged within libc (see Appendix A).
Backwards Compatibility. Modern toolchains sup-
port backwards compatibility through a technique called
weak aliasing. A weak alias signifies to the loader that
a particular function should be used only when a better
implementation (strong alias) does not exist. If available,
the dynamic linker will bind the symbol names to the
strong definitions, rendering the weak definitions redun-
dant; the unused weak implementation remains in mem-
ory and contributes to bloating.
For example, glibc 2.19 hosts 610 (29%) functions
that are marked as weak symbols including popular
memory management functions like calloc. In our
study, we found that complex software like Firefox
and mongodb provide custom implementations for mem-
ory management functions and override the one provided
in glibc. This situation manifests in all cases where a
functionality in one code module has a stronger binding
than code in another module.
Static Function Clones. In C/C++, the static keyword
is used to limit the scope of a function or variable within
the file in which it is defined. Due to the nature of how
the #include preprocessor directive works, whenever a
static function is defined within a header file, the com-
piler generates a copy of the function for each include.
Furthermore, since static functions are local to a file, they
do not trigger compile-time name conflicts.
Unused Functions. Static analysis during compilation
can efficiently remove dead code at a basic block level,
however, entire unused functions are not eliminated.
Consider the following program:
int f() { return 1; }
int main() { return 0; }
Both gcc and clang retain the function f in
the above code even under optimization level
-O3. Removal of unused functions require ad-
ditional non-standard often-unused compiler
(-fdata-sections -ffunction-sections -Os)
and linker (-Wl,--gc-sections) optimization flags.
Even so, unused functions in dynamically loaded
libraries can not be eliminated during compile time.
3 Overview
3.1 Key Challenges
Debloating requires precise identification of program-
wide intra- and inter-modular dependencies, which in-
troduces several challenges:
1. Modular Interdependencies: Programs can de-
pend on one or more dynamically linked shared
libraries and each shared library may depend on
other shared libraries. In essence, the library level
dependencies can be viewed as a directed graph
with cycles. The actual code path or function level
dependencies is similar to context-sensitive inter-
procedural analysis, a known hard problem in pro-
gram analysis.
2. Late binding: The binding between a function
symbol and the actual library that provides the func-
tionality is not known until run-time. Furthermore,
function binding depends on load order and poten-
tial use of weak symbols.
3. Code-pointer within libraries: Typically, calls
between shared libraries, or a shared library and
the main executable are routed through the PLT.
However, dependencies between functions within
libraries may not be apparent if code pointers are
used to invoke functions, especially if such invo-
cations happen within hand-written assembly code.
Similar to CFI, a practical solution must correctly
detect and include all dependencies arising from
code pointer accesses within shared libraries.
4. Dependencies within hand-written assembly
code: Generating inter-dependencies for assembly
code in a module at compile time is challenging be-
cause assembly code is not analyzed by the com-
piler, and function boundaries in optimized code are
sometime slurred.
5. Dynamically loaded libraries: Shared libraries
can be dynamically loaded at runtime using
dlopen. The use of this feature causes incom-
plete dependency information at program load time,
which in turn impacts correctness. We use a com-
bination of static analysis and training-based ap-
proach to preload and debloat dynamically loaded
libraries.
The techniques presented in this paper are common
to all code modules (i.e., shared and statically linked li-
braries, and executables). Yet, the impact of piece-wise
compilation and loading is best realized in shared li-
braries. This is because while existing compile- and link-
time optimizations can eliminate unused code within a
compilation unit, bloat arising due to dynamically loaded
modules persists due to the vast amounts of disjoint func-
tionalities in shared libraries.
At first glance, dynamically linked libraries are de-
signed for code reuse (e.g., one copy of a library is resi-
dent in memory for multiple processes) and fine-grained
function-level fragmentation of libraries in which each
function and its dependencies are encapsulated within
a single shared library may be an appealing solution.
For example, if a program uses only printf, then the
printf library that only contains printf and its depen-
dencies will be loaded. However, like in the static case,
this design is not ideal for usability since each focused
shared library is likely to be much smaller than the usual
4k page size granularity. This will result in heavy inter-
nal fragmentation, and much of the memory will remain
unused. Moreover, with such a design, complex software
is likely to require hundreds if not thousands of shared li-
braries. Consequently, load-time and runtime relocations
are likely to be high. Also, such a solution is not back-
ward compatible and the programs linked to use shared
libraries will now have to be recompiled to use multiple
smaller libraries.
3.2 High Level Approach
At a high-level, our approach bridges the traditional
information gap between early (compilation) and late
(loading) stages of a program. Specifically, (1) we de-
velop a piece-wise compiler that maintains intra-modular
(piece-wise) dependencies between each individual func-
tionality (i.e., entry point) and all dependent functions
that are necessary to satisfy execution, and (2) we de-
velop a piece-wise loader that examines the dependen-
cies of an executable and generates an inter-modular full-
program dependency graph. Finally, the loader system-
atically eliminates all code that is not a part of the full-
program dependency graph.
Our approach maintains the benefits of dynamically
linked libraries (e.g., code-reuse) with the benefits of
statically built programs (e.g., dead-code elimination). It
is driven by these high-level goals:
Program-Wide Dead Code Elimination. Our first goal
is to support load-time dead-code elimination. That is,
we aim to bring dead-code elimination benefits of static
linking to dynamic linking. In our approach, we ana-
lyze and embed functionality-specific metadata into code
modules during compilation. Specifically, the metadata
contains functions and all of the dependencies that are
required to be loaded together with it in order to provide
correct program execution. At runtime, when a program
or library requests a new symbol to be loaded, we use
the metadata to only load the dependent functionality.
Unused code (code that does not have a runtime depen-
dency) is never available to the program.
Backwards Compatibility. We wish to allow exist-
ing binaries to reap the benefits of load-time dead-code
elimination by debloating the dependent shared libraries,
without the explicit need to recompile the entire program.
To retain backwards compatibility, we embed the meta-
data into an optional section in the ELF file format. Op-
tional sections are ignored by unmodified loader, mean-
ing our ELF files are backwards compatible with older
loaders. As one would expect, our piece-wise loader is
able to make use of this extra information to achieve late-
stage code removal during loading. This way, any COTS
software can take advantage of our piece-wise technique
by simply replacing the shared libraries in a system with
piece-wise compiled shared libraries and replacing the
loader with our piece-wise loader.
Correctness. It is essential that the solution be con-
servative and retain all fragments of code within each
code module that the program may need during runtime.
Missing legitimate code dependencies will cause unac-
ceptable runtime program failures. We wish to prevent
such failures.
4 Piece-wise Compilation
For a given code module, the piece-wise compiler has
two main tasks: generate a function-level dependency
graph with zero false negatives (we do not want to miss
any legitimate dependency), and write this dependency
graph to the binary.
4.1 Dependency Graph Generation
In traditional dead-code elimination, analysis is per-
formed at the basic block level. Thus, a dependency
graph is effectively an annotated inter-procedural con-
trol flow graph. This fine granularity is not necessary for
our application since symbols are exported at a function
granularity. Our dependency graph is therefore an anno-
tated call graph.
We use a two-step process to generate the dependency
graph. First, we combine all object files and generate a
single complete call graph for the entire module. Then,
we traverse the call graph to generate the dependencies
for each exported function. Here, we leverage the inter-
modular code analysis and optimization logic present in
LLVM to derive function-level dependencies both within
a compilation unit and across a module. Of particular
importance is handling special cases that can affect the
accuracy of the call graph. Below, we detail the treatment
of such cases to ensure complete dependency recovery.
Two factors can have a significant effect on the ac-
curacy of a call graph: code pointers and jump tables,
and hand-written assembly (this includes pure-assembly
functions and inlined assembly). Below, we provide de-
tails about each case as well as how we handle them.
4.2 Handling Code Pointers/Indirect
Branching
The piece-wise compiler uses the call graph analysis pass
of LLVM to extract dependencies arising due to direct
calls between functions. However, indirect code-pointer
references require special handling. Like some CFI so-
lutions, we take a conservative approach and include a
set of all functions that could potentially be used as indi-
rect branch targets. While one can assume that a function
pointer can point to any valid function, this may not be
necessary. To see why, we separate the problem into two
cases - function pointers associated with symbols and
those that are not associated with symbols.
Function pointers that target symbols can be directly
identified as long as the target is internal to the module
being compiled. That is, the module contains code that
loads the target function address into the function pointer
as a constant. In other words, while the pointer itself is
not initialized until runtime, the target can be determined
statically. Pointers that target external function (still as-
sociated with symbols) can be reconciled at load time
when all of the external modules are loaded along with
the symbol information. Our piece-wise compiler is de-
signed to retain such information as well.
1 struct _IO_FILE {
2 ...
3 size_t (* write) (FILE *, char *, size_t);
4 };
5 static struct _IO_FILE f = {
6 ...
7 .write = __stdout_write ,
8 };
9 FILE *const stdout = &f;
10 static void close_file(FILE *f) {
11 ...
12 if (f->wpos > f->wbase)
13 f->write(f, 0, 0);
14 ...
15 }
Listing 1: File IO in musl-libc
Indirect code references can be classified into three
categories. We handle all 3 categories:
C1 Reference to a function pointer: In this category,
a function address is assigned—either directly or
through a function argument—to a variable by one
instruction and is used later by another instruction
(e.g., addr = &foo; addr();).
C2 Reference to a table of code pointers: Here, a ta-
ble or an array of function pointers is addressed
as a base+offset (e.g., void (*foo)[LEN]() =
&table; foo[4]();).
Jump tables, arrays of function pointers, and vtables
in C++ are all examples of this category.
C3 Reference to a composite structure: A more com-
plex case arises when code pointers are contained
within structures. Consider the example in List-
ing 1. Variable f is a global IO structure that con-
tains a pointer to the write function. This variable
is initialized as a global, but used in the close func-
tion. References through composite structures are
not uncommon, yet hard to detect.
Additionally, function pointers are used to implement
callback functions, and are passed as arguments dur-
ing callback registrations (e.g., arguments to signal,
qsort). Callbacks are also used to register initialization
and termination functions of a process (e.g. atexit).
Pointers passed through function arguments reduce toC1
in inter-procedural analysis. Function pointers are also
used to implement subtype polymorphism of records.
For example, in libc, a ‘FILE’ struct with a set of func-
tion pointers is created for every IO operation.
In order to obtain a complete set of code pointer ref-
erences within a module, we perform code-pointer anal-
ysis (function pointer analysis + jump table recovery) to
recover all potential code references either to functions
or to code snippets (e.g., targets in switch statement).
We introduce two new independent approaches to handle
indirect control-flow transfers: full-module code pointer
scanning and localized code pointer scanning. They are
based on an observation that all functions serving as indi-
rect targets must have their addresses taken at some point
during execution. A function has its address taken when
its address is referenced as a constant somewhere within
a module. Additionally, we leverage well-studied points-
to analysis techniques. Comparison between these three
approaches can be found in Section 6.
Full-Module Code Pointer Scan. In this approach, our
compiler statically generates a global set of functions as
global dependency for the entire module. Each instruc-
tion in the LLVM IR is scanned for code pointer ref-
erences, and when a reference is found, the referenced
code is recorded as a required global dependency. The
global dependency includes all functions that have their
addresses referenced inside the module. These depen-
dencies are annotated as “required” in the optional sec-
tion of the ELF binary, and therefore will be retained in
memory at runtime. While this approach may not result
in optimal code reduction, it is fast and is guaranteed to
include all possible targets of indirect branches.
Localized Code Pointer Scan. Similar to the full-
module scan, the localized scan aims to include all possi-
ble indirect branch targets in the working module. How-
ever, we observe that among all code addresses that the
compiler detects, only a selective few actually have their
addresses taken at runtime; we can safely unload the rest
of code pointers to boost debloating result, without loss
of correctness. For example, suppose in the code snippet
in Listing 2, comp is referenced only by function foo.
Then, comp is marked as a dependency for foo, and is
retained if foo is also retained. Similarly, if multiple
functions depend on comp, it is added to the dependency
graph of each function. This is unlike the full-module
scan where comp is marked as required for the entire
module.
1 ...
2 int comp(int a, int b) {...}
3 int foo() { ... /* foo is a global symbol */
4 sort(arr , len , &comp); }
5 ...
Listing 2: Localized Code Pointer Scan Example
First, use-def chains are constructed for all IR instruc-
tions. Here, unlike traditional use-def analysis, we are
only interested in the referring nodes that directly take a
function’s address. To accurately recover all instructions
that use function address, our compiler recursively tra-
verse the use-def chains until it encounters a referring-
instruction that refers a function. At that point, a de-
pendency is recorded between the function that contains
the referring instruction and the referred function. When
compared to the full-module scan, by leveraging symbol
binding information available, this approach improves
dependency graph’s correctness and debloats more ag-
gressively, but at the cost of analysis performance.
Pointer Analysis. We leverage points-to information
produced by pointer analysis to resolve indirect code
pointer dependencies within a library. Broadly, our ap-
proach is based on the inclusion-based algorithm first in-
troduced by Andersen [6], where a points-to set is main-
tained for each pointer variable. When an assignment
a = b is encountered, locations pointed to by b are as-
sumed to be a subset of locations pointed to by Our
implementation is based on the algorithm recently pro-
posed by Sui et al. [37]. Each LLVM IR statement with
a pointer reference is analyzed to extract rules that de-
fine how to generate points-to information. These form
the constraints. We extract four types of constraints that
were first proposed by Hardekopf and Lin [16] based
on semantics of the pointer reference. For convenience,
we include a reproduction in Table 2 below. These
Table 2: Points-to constraints. For a variable v, pts(v)
represents v’s points-to set and loc(v) represents the
memory location denoted by v.
Program Code Constraint Meaning
a = &b a ⊇ {b} loc(b) ∈ pts(a)
a= b a⊇ b pts(a)⊇ pts(b)
a= ∗b a⊇ ∗b ∀v ∈ pts(b) : pts(a)⊇ pts(v)
∗a= b ∗a⊇ b ∀v ∈ pts(a) : pts(v)⊇ pts(b)
constraints are then fed into a constraint solver to ex-
tract concrete pointer values/value sets at different code-
pointer reference points within functions. These pointers
form dependencies for the functions. We refer readers to
SVF [37] for additional details.
Object-Sensitive Analysis for C++ Code. Due to vir-
tual function dispatch in C++, indirect code pointers that
are referenced through a VTable require special han-
dling. Two separate solutions are considered. First, a
naive solution would be to include (and persist in mem-
ory) all functions in all VTables. While such an approach
will include all required dependencies, it fails to provide
optimal bloat reduction.
For the second approach, we introduce object-
sensitive analysis in Algorithm 1 to identify precise vir-
tual function dependencies. For each function within the
dependency graph, we examine the code to identify all
the types of C++ objects that are instantiated within the
function and gather the corresponding VTables. Next, for
Algorithm 1 Gathering virtual function dependencies in
C++ code. Function GetFunctionDeps recursively tra-
verses call graph to provide a complete list of dependen-
cies for a given function.
1: procedure GETDEPENDENCIES(Function)
2: Deps← /0
3: for each DepFunc ∈ GetFunctionDeps(Function) do
4: Deps← Deps∪GetDependencies(DepFunc)
5: end for
6: for each Ob ject ∈ Function do . Function
instantiates Object
7: VTable← GetVTable(TypeO f (Ob ject))
8: for each VFunc ∈VTable do
9: Deps← Deps∪VFunc
10: end for
11: end for
12: return Deps
13: end procedure
each type of object, we include all of the virtual functions
in the VTable for the corresponding class as a depen-
dency for the function that instantiates the object. This
way, if an object is never instantiated, its VTable func-
tions are debloated. Finally, we incorporate in our solu-
tion pointer analysis to handle C++ virtual dispatch.
4.3 Handling Assembly Code
Compilers do not optimize hand-written and inline as-
sembly code and, as such, interdependencies involving
assembly code are handled separately.
Dependencies in assembly code: We perform a single
pass through assembly code to identify all function calls
and update the callgraph accordingly. From our experi-
ments, we find that this simple approach is sufficient to
capture all the higher-level (e.g., C/C++) function depen-
dencies for code originating from assembly.
Dependencies on assembly code: Identifying assembly
code dependencies for high-level functions is more diffi-
cult since function boundaries in optimized code is some-
times blurred due to code reuse. For example, some func-
tions jump directly into the middle of the assembly code
for memcpy instead of calling memcpy directly. We take
a conservative approach and retain all assembly code as
necessary. As such, assembly code is never removed
from memory. Handwritten assembly is uncommon and
therefore including it does not significantly impact bloat.
4.4 Writing Dependency Graph to Binary
Once the dependency graph is generated, it is embed-
ded into a dedicated section called .dep. Our com-
piler inserts two types of information to assist the loader
with identifying dead code: dependency relationships
between functions (i.e. the dependency graph) that
comprises of functions and a list of dependencies, and
function-specific data that includes location and size in
bytes for all the functions in the dependency graph. Since
a function’s address is unknown at link time, we instead
mark all location fields in .dep section as relative relo-
catable and let the loader patch them with real addresses
during program load time. While the piece-wise com-
piler only embeds function dependency information in
binary, it can retains more information to assist precise
late-stage security enforcement such as CFI.
5 Piece-Wise Loader
Figure 1 illustrates the workflow of our piece-wise
loader. After receiving control from the kernel, the
loader first maps all dependent libraries onto the cur-
rent process’ address space, then performs relocation on
all modules, and finally eliminates all dead code from
piece-wise-compiled libraries. Our current implementa-
tion readily supports position independent code and can
be easily deployed in current Linux ecosystems.
5.1 Pre-Loading Dependencies
In order to generate a complete set of all exported library
functions that a program requires, the piece-wise loader
must resolve the dependencies within the program exe-
cutable along with all the other shared objects the exe-
cutable depends on. Since loaders are designed to load
libraries when they are first used, some libraries may not
be loaded when the program starts. This results in in-
complete symbol information. To address this, our loader
pre-loads all shared libraries.
First, the piece-wise loader recursively traverses all
shared objects and their dependencies (by looking at
DT NEEDED entries of the dynamic section of the ELF file
of the program executable) to construct the list of shared
objects that the main program needs. Then, it maps their
memory segments onto the process image. Effectively,
a program and all of its dependent code are loaded into
memory before transferring control to the user code.
Handling Dynamically Loaded Libraries. Dynami-
cally loaded libraries create function dependencies that
are unknown during both compile time (and therefore
are not encoded in dependency graphs) and load time.
Thus, as a result of late-stage piece-wise debloating,
such functions are removed and unavailable in cases
where dynamically loaded libraries require them. Sup-
port for shared libraries that are loaded dynamically (us-
ing dlopen) proves to be a challenge. On the one hand,
for cases where we can statically detect which libraries
Figure 1: Workflow of the piece-wise loader
will be dynamically loaded, i.e. arguments to functions
like dlopen are hard-coded in binaries, we directly pre-
load them. On the other hand, handling dynamically gen-
erated library names is challenging. An example of such
case can be found in Listing 3:
1 lib_name = compute_lib_name ();
2 handle = dlopen(lib_name , RTLD_NOW);
Listing 3: Example of dynamically generated library
name.
Failure to accommodate for the library’s dependen-
cies will cause a runtime failure. However, the non-
determinism makes ensuring absolute correctness in-
tractable. Therefore, we take a training-based approach
to identify all missing dependency caused by dynamic
loading. For each program, we record all shared libraries
loaded using dlopen at runtime as well as their functions
that are invoked by dlsym and embed this information
within the binaries. At load time, the piece-wise loader
will interpret it, pre-load those libraries, and retain only
the functions that dlsym invokes.
We found that only 64/2226 (2.9%) programs in our
study dynamically compute module names. In our test
set, all library name computations are straightforward:
library names are hard-coded or generated using format
string. For example, if (var) sprintf(name,
"lib%s v1.so", basename) else sprintf(name,
"lib%s v2.so", basename). In our experience, train-
ing for common workloads reveal required shared-lib
dependencies.
5.2 Symbol Resolution & Relocation
After loading the libraries and performing the necessary
symbol bindings, the loader walks through the depen-
dency information in the .dep section and marks code
as necessary. All unnecessary code is zeroed out. Re-
call that the dependency information in the optional .dep
section contains the symbol as well as its location in the
binary and size. In order to support relocation of the
piece-wise compiled libraries, these locations must be
updated prior to resolving all dependencies. Handling
relocation for .dep section is straightforward. Tradition-
ally, at load time, the loader will walk through all relocat-
able fields in a mapped ELF image and patch them with
appropriate addresses. We simply ensure that the same
procedure also applies to the optional .dep section and
updates its relocatable fields.
Recall that loaders prioritize the resolution of strong
symbols over weak ones. Therefore, if two libraries of-
fer bindings to the same symbol, the first strong symbol
is resolved — this depends on the order of which shared
libraries are loaded. As a result, the behavior is also run-
time dependent.
Since we pre-load libraries in the order they appear
in an ELF file, symbol resolution is also performed in
the same order. This process, called pre-binding, ensures
that each required symbol is bound to the concrete def-
inition in the executable or a shared library before the
program begins execution. Therefore, all dependencies
for a program are known before it begins execution.
To determine which functions are not required at run-
time, i.e., the ones that must be removed, we rely on sym-
bol resolution and the dependency graph embedded in
the .dep section. During symbol resolution, the loader
binds an undefined symbol to the first available definition
for the symbol in the load order which allows our loader
to identify which library functions the program imports.
At the end of symbol resolution, all symbols in the
global symbol table are fully resolved and reflect the run-
time necessities of the program. If there are two differ-
ent definitions of the same symbol name in two separate
code modules, only one will be picked; we can safely
zero out the other. For example, if foo.exe depends on
function myFoo, which is defined in both shared libraries
a.so and b.so, the symbol is resolved to whichever li-
brary is loaded first. That is, if a.so is loaded before
b.so, then myFoo in b.so is never used, and is there-
fore removed. The dependency graph in the .dep sec-
tion for each resolved symbol is used to determine pre-
cisely which further dependencies to retain. For exam-
ple, if myFoo is resolved to a.so, and myFoo’s depen-
dency contains function myBar in a.so, then myBar will
be retained alongside myFoo in a.so.
The result generated from this step is a list of functions
to be removed from each library.
5.3 Removal of Dead Code
There are two approaches to eliminating dead code: ei-
ther we start with a clean canvas and load each required
function and its dependencies, or we load the entire mod-
ule and remove dead code. To support shared libraries,
since most code and data references are relative due to
position-independent code, we implement the latter in
our prototype. This preserves the offset between func-
tions and therefore does not require any unnecessary
code modifications.
All functions in a piece-wise module that do not form
direct or indirect dependencies are marked for removal.
If all the code in a page is marked for removal, we sim-
ply set the non-executable bit on the page and no code
deletion is performed. To remove a certain function,
the loader invokes mprotect to mark the correspond-
ing code page(s) as writable and non-executable. Next,
every byte in the function body is set to a special 1-byte
invalid instruction. In the x86 and x86 64 architectures,
we pick byte 0x6d since it is a reserved instruction that
raises an ‘Illegal Instruction’ exception. Once all unused
functions are removed, a piece-wise library is rendered
bloat-free.
Backward compatibility. Both piece-wise-compiled
modules and the piece-wise loader are backward com-
patible for two reasons. First, our changes are restricted
to the optional .dep section in a code module while all
other sections remain intact. Therefore, a regular loader
simply ignores the .dep section and skips support for
debloating. Second, when the piece-wise loader loads a
code module without the .dep section, it simply behaves
like a regular non-piece-wise loader. No modifications
are required to the program being executed as long as
the program is configured to use the piece-wise loader.
This can be accomplished by patching the .interp sec-
tion of the ELF binary and changing it from the default
loader (e.g. /lib/ld-linux.so) to the pathname of the
new piece-wise loader e.g. /lib/pw-linux.so.
Memory overhead due to copy-on-write. When
the piece-wise loader marks an entire page as non-
executable, it incurs no memory overhead. An overhead
(due to CoW) is incurred when partial removal occurs
in a page. Because large fractions of code are typically
eliminated from the memory, very few pages actually re-
quire CoW. In general problems arise when ”multiple”
long-lived processes share large libraries, or when un-
used code is distributed across multiple pages. While we
did not engineer the support for dynamically rewriting
the binary to reduce memory overhead, we refer inter-
ested readers to artificial diversity research for an algo-
rithm [21].
6 Evaluation
We divide our evaluation into three main parts: debloat-
ing correctness (sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2), performance
overhead (section 6.3), and impact of debloating on se-
curity (section 6.4). Because our solution neither adds
executable code in the program nor alters the code lay-
out, we do not introduce any runtime execution overhead.
All of our experiments were performed on a system with
Intel Core i7-4790 @ 3.60GHz and 32GB RAM running
Ubuntu Desktop 16.04 LTS.
6.1 Implementation and Prototype
We implemented two different versions of piece-wise
loaders: (1) the GNU loader (v2.23) distributed with
Ubuntu Desktop 16.04, and (2) the loader packaged
within musl-libc (v1.1.15). Because glibc can not
be compiled using LLVM, we used musl-libc for
the C library debloating evaluation. Accordingly, the
GNU loader was used in experiments where glibc was
used (the modified loader debloated libraries other than
glibc), and the musl loader was used to debloat pro-
grams that used musl-libc. Both loaders were de-
signed to retain and load non-piece-wise compiled li-
braries without any changes.
The piece-wise compiler is built on top of LLVM-
4.0 with an additional 2.46 KLOC. First, we added an
LLVM module pass to handle code pointers, process
points-to information (if applicable), parse function calls
from assembly code and generate a dependency graph.
Second, to support C++ libraries, we implemented an
object-sensitive approach described in Algorithm 1. We
evaluated our C++ libraries debloating on libflac++
using Audacity, a program editing audio files. Our
analysis and dependency graph generation and insertion
passes are run during the link-time optimization (LTO)
in LLVM gold plugin. We also developed an ELF binary
patching program that patches an ELF binary to modify
the .interp section to change the default loader to the
piece-wise loader.
6.2 Correctness Experiments
To demonstrate that our toolchain correctly debloats code
modules, we used the piece-wise compiler to build 400
shared libraries distributed with Ubuntu Desktop 16.04
and installed them using dpkg. Next, we replaced the
GNU loader with our piece-wise loader.
Below, we consider each set of libraries to gain a better
understanding of the effectiveness and security benefits
that our solution offers.
6.2.1 Musl-libc Experiements
Due to known fundamental limitations in compil-
ing glibc using LLVM[1], we piece-wise compiled
musl-libc—another popular and comprehensive flavor
of the C library. The difference in functionality between
Table 3: Percentage Attack Space Reduction with Piece-Wise for coreutils and SPEC CPU 2006 with musl-libc.
Program Full-module Code Pointer Scan Inclusion-based Pointer Analysis Localized Code Pointer Scan% Function
Reduction
% Instruction
Reduction
% Function
Reduction
% Instruction
Reduction
% Function
Reduction
% Instruction
Reduction
Minimal Program 60 60 89 91 88 91
Coreutils Min 59 59 85 85 84 85
Coreutils Max 60 60 88 90 88 91
Coreutils Mean 56 58 79 78 79 79
bzip2 60 60 89 90 88 91
sjeng 59 59 85 86 85 86
sphinx3 59 60 86 85 81 82
mcf 60 60 85 83 87 87
lbm 58 59 83 83 87 87
gcc 60 60 87 87 84 87
milc 59 59 88 88 84 85
h264ref 60 60 88 87 84 83
hmmer 60 60 85 85 82 83
gobmk 60 60 86 86 85 86
libquantum 58 58 81 82 87 89
SPEC CPU 2006
Mean 59 60 86 86 85 86
glibc and musl-libc does not affect the feasibility and
capability of the piece-wise toolchain.
To get a sense of how much glibc can be de-
bloated, we extracted 30 different features and the func-
tions within each feature from the glibc software de-
velopment manual [4], and mapped them to analo-
gous symbols in musl-libc. We piece-wise compiled
musl-libc, and computed the footprint for each cate-
gory. Our findings are tabulated in Table 11 and a cor-
responding cumulative distribution is represented in Fig-
ure 2 in Appendix A.
The virtual memory allocation and paging related
functions are most widely used, but only account for
1.91% of instructions. Similarly, string related functions
are second most widely used, but contribute only 5.82%
of instructions. This result solidifies our findings from
the pervasiveness study in Section 2, and highlights the
vast amounts of unused libc code in typical program
memory. Mathematics (different from Arithmetic) con-
tributes the most code, but is seldom used. We expect
glibc to be just as bloated due to the functional simi-
larities between glibc and musl-libc. Unfortunately,
due to constraints in building glibc [1] we are unable to
provide concrete evidence at this time.
Debloating coreutils. Using the piece-wise compiled
musl-libc, we tested coreutils to evaluate correct-
ness and performance. All of the programs (109 in total)
in coreutils passed the coreutils test suite that is
packaged with coreutils source code without errors.
Table 3 shows the percentage of attack space reduction
achieved with piece-wise on coreutils programs and
a minimal program for each code pointer handling ap-
proach. The minimal program contains a main function
that immediately returns. Percentage of attack space re-
duction achieved with minimal program serves as a lower
bound for debloating musl-libc. Our results show that,
among the three approaches for handling code pointers,
localized code pointer scan and pointer analysis achieve
the best debloating result (79% and 78% respectively)
while full-module debloats the least, 58%. For some
programs, (e.g., make-prime-list), 91% of libc code
was removed without errors for localized scan.
Debloating SPEC CPU2006 benchmark programs.
Similarly, in order to verify correctness, we also evalu-
ated SPEC CPU2006 benchmark programs using piece-
wise compiled musl-libc with all three code pointer
handling approaches. Results are tabulated in Table 3.
We note that the latest version of musl-libc does not
fully support the SPEC CPU2017 benchmarks. All of
the programs ran successfully and passed the reference
workload. In the best case, 86% attack space reduction
was achieved with localized scan and pointer analysis,
and in the worst case, 60% code reduction was achieved
for full-module pointer scan.
While on average, pointer analysis and localized code
pointer scan yield the same attack space reduction re-
sults, for some cases in the SPEC CPU 2006 bench-
marks, we observe that one outperformed the other. Be-
cause localized code pointer scan records the relation-
ships between the functions that contains referencing in-
structions and the referenced functions, the piece-wise
loader will only remove an address taken function if all
referring functions are removed. Thus, this approach
takes advantage of symbol resolution information only
available at program load time. On the one hand, the
localized scan approach provides better debloating re-
sults when it allows removing functions that will not have
address taken at runtime because all referring functions
Table 4: Gadget reduction in coreutils 8.2 and SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks for 6 different types of security
sensitive gadgets: syscall, stack pointer update (SPU), call-oriented programming (COP), call-site/call preceded gad-
gets(CS), jump-oriented programming (JOP), and entry-point (EP). For each type, we list the quantity found in de-
bloated musl-libc and the percentage reduction achieved by piece-wise toolchain. In vanilla musl-libc, we found a
total of 5619 unique gadgets, 485 syscall, 924 SPU, 334 COP, 780 CS, 47 JOP, and 22 EP.
Program Total syscall SPU COP CS JOP EP
Minimal Program 993 82.33% 106 78.14% 147 84.09% 80 76.05% 109 86.03% 18 61.70% 4 81.82%
coreutilts max 1971 64.92% 205 57.73% 325 64.83% 182 45.51% 253 67.56% 24 48.94% 5 77.27%
coreutils min 1274 77.33% 117 75.88% 187 79.76% 119 64.37% 149 80.90% 21 55.32% 4 81.82%
coreutils mean 1591 71.69% 142 70.75% 245 73.45% 138 58.67% 186 76.15% 23 51.02% 4 81.60%
bzip2 1256 77.65% 108 77.73% 185 79.98% 111 66.77% 150 80.77% 21 55.32% 4 81.82%
gcc 1749 68.87% 144 70.31% 285 69.16% 156 53.29% 210 73.08% 26 44.68% 4 81.82%
gobmk 1545 72.50% 141 70.93% 246 73.38% 137 58.98% 177 77.31% 21 55.32% 4 81.82%
h264ref 1467 73.89% 120 75.26% 220 76.19% 130 61.08% 165 78.85% 21 55.32% 4 81.82%
hmmer 1499 73.32% 130 73.20% 230 75.11% 133 60.18% 173 77.82% 24 48.94% 4 81.82%
lbm 1685 70.01% 125 74.23% 259 71.97% 183 45.21% 204 73.85% 26 44.68% 4 81.82%
libquantum 1570 72.06% 125 74.23% 239 74.13% 144 56.89% 174 77.69% 23 51.06% 4 81.82%
mcf 1367 75.67% 119 75.46% 203 78.03% 128 61.68% 159 79.62% 21 55.32% 4 81.82%
milc 1810 67.79% 166 65.77% 274 70.35% 199 40.42% 243 68.85% 25 46.81% 4 81.82%
sjeng 1417 74.78% 122 74.85% 202 78.14% 133 60.18% 165 78.85% 21 55.32% 4 81.82%
sphinx3 1398 75.12% 120 75.26% 199 78.46% 127 61.98% 161 79.36% 21 55.32% 4 81.82%
SPEC CPU 2006
Mean 1,524 72.88% 129 73.38% 231 74.99% 144 56.97% 180 76.91% 23 51.64% 4 81.82%
have been removed while pointer analysis does not. On
the other hand, pointer analysis debloats more than lo-
calized scan when the number of retained address taken
functions is larger than the size of points-to set.
6.2.2 Debloating COTS binaries
In order to demonstrate the efficacy of our approach on
COTS binaries, we debloated unmodified programs in
the Ubuntu 16.04 Desktop environment. First, we piece-
wise compiled a set of shared libraries (minus glibc).
Then, we replaced the default loader with the piece-wise
loader, and the default libraries with the piece-wise com-
piled libraries. A subset of the shared libraries with vari-
ous compile-time overheads are presented in Table 9.
First, we confirmed that the piece-wise loader was able
to successfully load unmodified shared libraries. Next,
we manually tested a variety of unmodified executables
— FireFox, curl, git, ssh and LibreOffice pro-
grams that used the piece-wise compiled libraries. We
were able to verify that the loader correctly loaded the
piece-wise compiled libraries, and all of them ran under
normal use without errors. The bloat reduction results
for curl are tabulated in Table 5 for each code pointer
handling approach. Despite not debloating glibc, we
were able to reduce bloat by over 39.84% on average for
localized scan. In general, libraries that are general pur-
pose are more bloated (e.g., libasn1) than the libraries
that are a part of the application pacakge (e.g., libcurl).
We demonstrate that a COTS binary which uses glibc
can still be debloated, even if glibc is not piece-wise
compiled. We show that our solution can target some if
not all shared libraries used by a program, and is truly
backward compatible.
6.2.3 Debloating C++ Libraries
To demonstrate piece-wise seamless support for
C++ code, we successfully compiled and debloated
libFLAC++. We were able to successfully remove
46.09% of functions or 66.90% of instructions. Debloat-
ing results are summarized in table 6.
6.2.4 Piece-wise vs Static Linking
While static linking provides optimal debloating bene-
fits, its use in practice is limited due to the following rea-
sons:
• Requires recompilation of binaries with every li-
brary or software update.
• Does not allow memory sharing across processes.
• May result in accidental violation of (L)GPL.
• Increases binary size compared with dynamic link-
ing.
• Risks transferring bugs in a shared library to the bi-
nary.
Since piece-wise aims to bring dead code elimination
benefits from static linking to dynamic linking, in table 8,
we compare whole-program code reduction achieved by
static linking with late-stage debloating using piece-wise
toolchain. The percentage reduction in this table takes
into account both program and library code to accurately
delineate program-wise debloating of both approaches.
Table 5: Percentage Attack Space Reduction for 14 piece-wise libraries used by curl program.
Library Full-module Code Pointer Scan Inclusion-based Pointer Analysis Localized Code Pointer Scan% Function
Reduction
% Instruction
Reduction
% Function
Reduction
% Instruction
Reduction
% Function
Reduction
% Instruction
Reduction
libasn1 21.15% 41.85% 22.01% 42.18% 22.01% 42.17%
libcurl 3.43% 2.30% 28.57% 40.79% 25.14% 39.74%
libgssapi 7.70% 9.67% 14.96% 26.11% 38.62% 73.12%
libheimbase 7.37% 9.15% 11.54% 21.38% 25.64% 50.86%
libheimntlm 14.06% 34.45% 14.06% 34.46% 14.06% 34.45%
libheimsqlite 0.63% 0.17% 2.68% 1.59% 17.23% 11.30%
libhx509 18.39% 35.25% 24.40% 44.40% 35.89% 65.05%
libidn 19.84% 20.77% 19.84% 20.77% 19.84% 20.77%
libkrb5 13.98% 18.49% 21.55% 30.45% 26.73% 41.44%
libp11-kit 7.14% 11.07% 63.07% 74.95% 58.21% 65.78%
librtmp 21.05% 21.50% 21.05% 21.51% 22.22% 22.30%
libtasn1 16.76% 31.34% 16.76% 31.35% 16.76% 31.34%
libwind 8.75% 16.23% 15.00% 19.95% 8.75% 16.23%
libz 35.61% 35.97% 35.61% 36.15% 37.07% 43.21%
Mean 13.99% 20.59% 22.22% 31.86% 26.30% 39.84%
Table 6: Debloating libFLAC++ with Audacity.
Handling Technique # RemovedFunctions
# Removed
Instructions
# Functions
Total
# Instructions
Total
% Function
Reduction
% Instruction
Reduction
Object-sensitive,
Inclusion-based
Pointer Analysis
271 5831 588 8716 46.09% 66.90%
Static linking provides an upper bound for dead code
elimination. Localized code pointer scan was able to re-
move most of the code from program’s address space,
followed by pointer analysis and full-module scan. Over-
all, we observe that piece-wise’s dead code elimination
benefit is comparable but not as efficient as static linking
due to analysis accuracy and the retention of necessary
code for piece-wise loading and code removal.
6.3 Performance Overhead
Compile-time overhead. We measured execution
time added by our LLVM pass for each of the
three approaches (full-module scan, localized scan and
inclusion-based points-to analysis) by inserting timing
code at the beginning and end of pass’ main logic. The
results are tabulated in Table 9. Full-module scan is the
quickest followed by localized scan. Both incur reason-
able overhead (worst case < 800ms). Due to constraint-
solving, points-to analysis was the slowest. In general,
we found greater-than-linear increase in overhead intro-
duced by points-to analysis with respect to the code size,
with up to 4 minutes for libheimsqlite.so. While
this is indeed a large overhead, we believe that this one-
time overhead is reasonable given the large attack space
reduction it provides (see Section 6.4).
Load-time overhead. Our changes to the loader, which
eventually removes unused shared library code before
transferring control to libc start main only affects
a program’s start-up time. We do not add any code to
the program’s execution. Load time overhead caused
by debloating comes from two sources. First, since we
have added code to piece-wise loader to perform debloat-
ing, this extra logic introduces overhead to a program’s
load time. To measure this, we ran each program in
coreutils sequentially, measured load time for default
and piece-wise loaders, then computed the overhead. On
average, the code piece-wise loader that performs de-
bloating added 20 milliseconds to the each process load
time across all coreutils programs.
Second, because piece-wise loader writes to code
pages that contain the copies of shared libraries, copy-
on-write is triggered, which results in additional load
time overhead. To measure debloating’s effect on sys-
tem with a large number of debloated processes run-
ning concurrently, we launched a number of programs
in coreutils simultaneously and measured the over-
head caused by the piece-wise loader. With all 106 pro-
grams running concurrently, we observed an overhead of
49 milliseconds for each process. We are currently work-
ing on a solution to minimize the loadtime overhead.
Table 7: Vulnerabilities Removed after Debloating Libraries
Library CVE-ID Functions Affected Program Vulnerability Type
zlib-1.2.8 CVE-2016-9842 inflateMark
git, curl,
LibreOffice, firefox Undefined Behavior
libcurl-7.35
CVE-2016-7167
curl escape,
curl easy escape,
curl unescape,
and curl easy unescape
curl Integer Overflow
CVE-2014-3707 curl easy duphandle curl, cmake Out-of-bound Read, Use After Free
CVE-2016-9586 curl mprintf cmake Buffer Overflow
Table 8: Whole-process attack space reduction of static linking and piece-wise for coreutils and SPEC CPU 2006.
Program Static Linking Pointer Analysis Localized Scan Full-module Scan
Minimum Program 99.55% 95.67% 96.11% 63.42%
coreutils mean 81.42% 76.18% 78.22% 54.97%
bzip2 84.28% 78.38% 81.18% 43.33%
gcc 14.13% 13.10% 13.57% 7.55%
gobmk 39.37% 36.55% 37.84% 21.28%
h264ref 44.94% 41.78% 43.28% 25.06%
hmmer 59.05% 55.13% 57.00% 33.13%
lbm 88.75% 82.33% 85.24% 47.16%
libquantum 87.23% 80.86% 83.77% 45.61%
mcf 89.66% 83.24% 86.15% 47.66%
milc 75.26% 70.05% 72.49% 41.25%
sjeng 76.76% 71.39% 73.89% 41.36%
sphinx3 68.72% 64.50% 66.47% 38.82%
Table 9: Piece-wise LLVM Pass Execution Time. All
entries are in milliseconds.
Library
Full-Module
Code Pointer
Scan
Inclusion-based
Analysis
Localized
Code Pointer
Scan
musl-libc 73 28661 158
libasn1 40.80 16,000 41.40
libcurl 23 891 79.10
libgssapi 14.10 31,600 132
libheimbase 6.30 1,570 8.94
libheimntlm 0.81 275 1.02
libheimsqlite 406 241,000 3,380
libhx509 22.20 12,700 4.07
libidn 0.67 0.68 0.68
libkrb5 165 20,700 776
libp11-kit 6.95 4,330 0.89
librtmp 2.66 1,000 3.31
libtasn1 2.19 1,370 2.36
libwind 0.27 186 0.25
libz 1.20 1,530 7.63
6.4 Attack Space Reduction
Gadget Elimination. While gadget reduction does not
stop all attacks, it does give an estimate of how much
attack space is reduced. In Table 4, we show overall
gadget reduction as well as reduction security-sensitive
gadgets that have been extensively used in previously
published work such as syscall [34], stack-pointer update
(SPU) [35, 15], call-oriented programming (COP) [11],
call-site/call preceded (CS) [15, 11] , jump-oriented pro-
gramming (JOP) [9], and entry-point (EP) [15] gad-
gets. This reduction is measured in musl-libc for
coreutils and SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks using
ROPgadget [33]. Overall, we were able to remove 71%
of gadgets. Although we did not test for exploitation,
elimination of high-impact gadgets will, in principle,
hamper return-to-libc and code-reuse exploits.
Vulnerability Elimination. Another observable security
benefit of removing unused code is that we also eliminate
its vulnerabilities. We perform an extensive study on all
shared libraries we tested, analyzed all removed func-
tions, and cross-referenced them with the list of reported
CVE for each libraries. Results are listed in table 7.
6.5 Case Study: CVE-2014-3707
Curl is a widely used program with known critical se-
curity vulnerabilities. In fact, over 25 vulnerabilities
in curl have been reported in 2016 alone [2]. Simi-
larly, the curl library used by many programs for han-
dling file transfers (e.g. cmake, LibreOffice, git, Luau,
and OpenOffice) has reported several vulnerabilities.
Our solution significantly reduces attack space through
libcurl debloating and therefore offers several secu-
rity benefits, one of which is vulnerability elimination
as listed in table 7. To demonstrate this, we show how an
attacker can leak information using a vulnerability dis-
covered in libcurl and how our solution defeats this
through debloating.
CVE-2014-3707 [3] is an out-of-bound read vul-
nerability in function curl easy duphandle affecting
libcurl versions 7.17.1 to 7.38.0 that can be exploited
for memory disclosure and denial-of-service attacks.
curl easy duphandle uses strdup to copy buffers un-
der the assumption that they are C strings terminated by
NULL. If the assumption is violated, strdup will read be-
yond buffers’ boundaries, allowing an attacker to crash
the program by triggering a segmentation fault or, in the
worst case scenario, perform an out-of-bound memory
read. To make matters worse, after duplication, it fails to
update the pointer to point to the new buffer which can
trigger illegal use of freed memory if original object has
been freed.
Our evaluation shows that debloating libcurl when
it is used with programs like curl or cmake completely
removes the affected functions and therefore the bug can
no longer be exploited to perform a memory disclosure
or a denial-of-service attack as part of an exploit pay-
load such as through a return-to-libc attack. We em-
phasize that our solution will not only eliminate known
vulnerabilities but will also potentially remove yet-to-be-
discovered ones. This is one of the many security advan-
tages that come with code debloating.
7 Related Work
Attack-Space Reduction Approaches. Numerous ef-
forts have attempted to defeat attacks by enforcing var-
ious forms of program properties such as SPI [29, 31]
and CFI as it decreases the size of the CFG and re-
tains compile-time information. CFI solutions extract the
CFG and add instrumentation checks to the binary either
by relying on source code and debugging information [5,
39], or by analyzing the binary itself [49, 48]. Variations
of CFI targeting either performance [30, 8, 47], or secu-
rity [22, 40] have been proposed.
ASLR [38, 7] was introduced as a means of preventing
attackers from reusing exploit code effectively against
multiple instantiations of a single vulnerable program.
Wartell et al. [41] introduced binary stirring, which in-
creases ASLR’s re-randomization frequency to each time
a program is launched. Qiao et al. [30] interpret the
ability to return to a location as a one-time capability,
which is issued in each calling context in order to en-
able a one-time return. Niu and Tan [24, 25, 26] created
a toolchain supporting fine-grained, per-input CFG gen-
eration and enforcement that combines dynamic linking,
support for JIT compilers and interoperability with un-
protected legacy binaries. Giuffrida et al. [14] pre-
sented a live re-randomization strategy for operating sys-
tem load-time address space randomization to defend
against return-into-kernel-text ROP attacks. Crane et
al. [12, 13] uses a combination of compiler transforma-
tions and hardware-based enforcement to mark pages as
execute-only, thereby defeating the objective of memory
disclosures. Techniques that combine CFI and ASLR
have also been proposed [23]. Piece-wise compilation
and loading is independent of, yet complements CFI-
based approaches.
Feature-based Software Customization. Unlike
C/C++, managed programing languages whose execu-
tion is monitored by Runtime Virtual Machine suffers
from significant runtime overhead or bloating due to the
extra logic added to manage an execution environment.
This bloating is categorized into two groups: memory
bloat and execution bloat. Xu et al. [44] and Bu et al. [10]
delegate the debloating task to developers, classifying
this problem as purely software engineering related. On
the other hand, Jiang et al. [20] propose a feature-based
solution that allows a developer to remove certain feature
in Java bytecode by performing static analysis. Jiang et
al. [19] introduces an automatic approach that statically
analyzes and removes unused codes in both Java appli-
cation and Java Runtime Environment. As a key dis-
tinction, our approach involves load-time dead-code re-
moval to debloat shared libraries and reduce attack space
in COTS binaries.
Pointer Analysis. Pointer analysis or points-to anal-
ysis, a well-studied and active research area, refers to
determining memory targets of a pointer at compile
time. Although precise flow-sensitive pointer analysis
allows for high-quality and aggressive optimization, it
is a proven NP-hard [18]. Numerous approaches have
been proposed to balance the trade-off between per-
formance/scalability and precision. A pointer analy-
sis algorithm is classified based on various dimensions
such as flow-sensitivity, context-sensitivity, intra/inter-
procedural, and heap modeling. Flow-sensitive algo-
rithms ([17], [46], [27]) take into account the control
flow of a procedure; thus, the points-to information is
more precise and different for each program point. How-
ever, a flow-insensitive points-to analysis (e.g. [6] for
inclusion-based and [36] for unification-based), is uni-
versal and refers to any execution points within a mod-
ule. Similarly, context-sensitive analysis (e.g. [42], [43],
[45]) generates more precise points-to information by in-
vestigating each call site’s context.
8 Conclusion
We presented a study across 2016 real world programs on
Ubuntu Desktop 16.04 and show that most of the code in
libc is seldom used. We implemented a prototype sys-
tem that performs piece-wise compilation and loading.
We evaluated the system and showed that libc can be
debloated to eliminate significant code fragments from
memory thereby reducing the attack space.
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A Appendix
Library-wise functional dependency is presented in Ta-
ble 10.
Table 10: Most frequently used shared libraries in the
study and their function-level code utility.
Library # programsthat use the lib Avg. % of functions used
libc 1932 24.64
libm 284 7.06
libstdc++ 266 37.77
libpthread 237 11.10
libnetpbm 201 4.74
libresolv 186 9.60
libglib 178 4.25
libtinfo 170 12.42
libgio 135 5.74
libdl 125 4.18
libz 116 6.07
libgcc 113 4.0
libX11 89 6.04
libXau 86 7.13
libselinux 72 8.57
Mean (top 15): 10.22
Functionality-size code footprint in musl is presented
in Table 11.
Musl code footprint by features is presented in Fig-
ure 2.
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Figure 2: A cumulative distribution of code footprint in libc versus frequently used libc functions in our study.
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